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where the only issue on habeas corpus is the propriety of issuance of the temporary restraining order violated by petitioners. At the time that order was issued, it is undisputed that M.E.B.A. had not lost the strike and, accordingly,
the picketing still arose from the dispute between M.E.B.A.
and Isthmian.
In conclusion, I believe that the ,Jurisdictional Strike Act
was designed to protect an employer from the effects of a
struggle between two or more unions, either for recognition
as bargaining agent or for a determination of which has the
exclusive right to perform certain work, in which the employer is an innocent party. I do not believe that the statute
was ever meant to protect an employer who is engaged in
a dispute with his employees and the union of their choice
over legitimate labor objectives, and who seeks a ban on otherwise lawful picketing on the ground that he has signed a
contract with another union willing to fill the jobs of the
striking workers, thereby himself creating the ''jurisdictional
dispute" from which he seeks relief.
In my opinion the petitioners should be released.
Traynor, J., concurred.
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied April 2,
1953. Carter, J., and Traynor, .J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

[S. F. No. 18519.

In Bank.

Mar. 10, 1953.]

ISTHMIAN STEAMSHIP COMPANY (a Corporation), et
al., Respondents, v. NATIONAij MARINE ENGINEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION et al., Appellants; BROTHERHOOD OF MARINE ENGINEERS,
AFL et al., Interveners and Respondents.
[1] Injunctions-AppeaL-In determining whether the facts war-

rant an order granting a preliminary injunction, the court on
appeal must review the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs.
[2] Id.- Preliminary Injunction.- A preliminary injunction,
granted to preserve the status quo, is based on the facts as
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunctions, § 112 ; [2] Injunctions,
§50; [3] Injunctions, §59.
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they existed when the action was commenced; and its propriety is not affected by the fact that a temporary restraining order previously issued in the same action may have swung
the balance in plaintiffs' favor.
[3] !d.-Preliminary Injunction.-Whether a preliminary injunction shall be granted rests largely in the discretion of the
trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless there
is a manifest abuse of discretion.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the City
and County of San Francisco granting a preliminary injunction enjoining picketing. Clarence W. Morris, Judge. Affirmed.
Delany, Werchick, I<'ishgold & Minudri, .Jack H. Werchick,
Lee Pressman, Robert E. Burns, Cummins, Kent, Draper &
Bradley for Appellants.
McCutchen, Thomas, Matthew, Griffiths & Greene and Morris M. Doyle for Respondents.
Tobriner & Lazarus and Mathew 0. Tobriner for Interveners and Respondents.
SHENK, ,J.-This is an appeal from an order granting a
preliminary injunction enjoining picketing of plaintiffs by
defendant union in an action for a permanent injunction and
damages. One phase of this case was before this court in
In re Regan and In re Kelleher, ante, p. 424 [254 P.2d
572]. In those cases, Regan and Kelleher sought their release from custody after their arrest for violating a temporary
restraining order issued by the court in the action, and we
there held that the Jurisdictional Strike Law (Lab. Code,
§ 1115 et seq.) furnished a proper basis for the restraining
order, and that plaintiffs' employees-marine engineerswere supervisory employees and hence not subject to the
National Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A.
§ 141 et seq.). The factual basis for the preliminary injunction is the same, with some amplification, as the temporary
restraining order in the Regan and Kelleher cases. Defendants
assert facts as grounds for reversal, in addition to the ones
raised in those cases, but nothing more than a conflict is
[3] See Cal.Jur., Injunctions, §59; Am.Jur., Injunctions § 267
et seq.
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created and the question of credibility of witnesses is presented, and this has been resolved favorably to plaintiffs by
the trial court in ordering the preliminary injunction. The
facts recited in the Kelleher and Regan cases are supported
by the record here.
Defendants make three additional legal arguments: (1)
'fhat a preliminary injunction will not be issued in a "doubtful" case; (2) that such an injunction is to preserve the
;.;tatus quo as it existed at the commencement of the action
and this one does not do so because the temporary restraining
order swung the balance in favor of plaintiff employer,
Isthmian Steamship Company; and (3) that the injunction
will cause defendants great damage.
[1] The first contention is answered in part by the fact
that the case is not necessarily close on its facts when we
review the evidence most favorable to plaintiffs, as we
must do since the trial court made the order in plaintiffs'
favor.
[2] The second contention is subject to the same comment as the first and also the injunction was based on the
facts as they existed when the action was commenced.
The third, and also the first and second contentions are
more properly addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
[3] Whether a preliminary injunction shall be granted rests
largely in the discretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed on appeal unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. (Thompson v. lYioore Drydock Co., 27 Cal.2d 595 [165
P.2d 901]; 14 CaLJur. 180 et seq.) We find no abuse of
discretion here.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent for the same reasons and upon the
same grounds stated in my dissents in Voeltz v. Bakery Workers, ante, p. 382 [254 P.2d 553] and In re Kelleher and
In re Regan, ante, p. 424 [254 P.2d 572].
Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 2,
1953. Carter, .J., and Traynor, ,J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

